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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The issue presented by this appeal is: Can these 
California Defendants, who have no contacts with Utah, be 
subjected to personal jurisdiction in Utah merely because the 
Plaintiff has relocated from California to Utah, and now 
alleges that the California Defendants committed a tort 
against the Plaintiff when they reported to California 
authorities certain criminal acts that the Plaintiff 
perpetrated in California before she relocated to Utah? 
This issue involves the review of a pretrial 
jurisdictional decision made on documentary evidence only. 
Accordingly, the District Court's decision is reviewed for 
correctness. Arauello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co.. 
838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE8, RULES. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and by Utah's long-arm statute which reads: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who 
in person or through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, 
his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this 
state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS 
Valerie Bryant ("Plaintiff") sued Lon Morton, Michael 
Landau, Morton Capital Management, The Morton Company, Inc., 
and California Capital Services, Inc. (collectively the 
"California Defendants") in the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County. Plaintiff alleged claims for malicious 
prosecution and defamation. 
The California Defendants moved the District Court to 
dismiss based on the Court's lack of personal jurisdiction. 
The District Court, Honorable Judge James Sawaya, determined 
that the California Defendants' Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
due process would be violated by the assertion of personal 
2 
jurisdiction over them in Utah. Based on that conclusion, the 
District Court dismissed, and Plaintiff appeals. 
II. FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL 
The facts for purposes of this appeal are to be taken 
from the affidavits of Lon Morton and Michael Landau (attached 
hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively). lf[T]he facts 
recited in the complaint are considered only to the extent 
that they do not contradict the affidavit[s]." Arauello v. 
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co.. 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 
1992) . The facts have thus been established as set forth 
below. 
Defendants Lon Morton and Michael Landau are citizens 
and residents of California. Neither of them has ever been a 
resident of Utah. They have never owned property in Utah and 
have never done business in Utah. [Affidavit of Lon Morton 
("Exhibit A") 1 2, at 1,; Affidavit of Michael Landau 
("Exhibit B") J 2, at 2]. 
Lon Morton is the majority shareholder of the three 
corporate defendants in this action: Morton Capital 
Management, The Morton Company, Inc., and California Capital 
Services, Inc. (collectively the "Morton Companies"). 
[Exhibit A f 1, at 1]. The Morton Companies are all 
California corporations with their collective principal place 
of business in California. None of the Morton Companies have 
ever done business in Utah. They have no property or clients 
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in Utah, maintain no offices in Utah, have never contracted to 
provide goods or services in Utah, and do not purchase goods 
or services from any persons or entities in Utah. [Exhibit A 
II 3, at 2]. 
In short, none of the California Defendants have any 
contacts with Utah. 
In April 1989, Plaintiff, then a resident of 
California, was hired by Lon Morton to be the Controller for 
the Morton Companies. [Exhibit A J 4, at 2]. Plaintiff 
continued her employment with the Companies until the end of 
February 1990, at which time she resigned and moved to Utah. 
[Exhibit A 1 7, at 2]. 
Before Plaintiff left California at the end of 
February 1990, Lon Morton requested that Plaintiff continue to 
provide consulting services to the Morton Companies in order 
to aid the Morton Companies in making the transition to a new 
Controller. [Exhibit A J 8, at 3]. While still in 
California, Plaintiff agreed to provide the requested 
assistance. [Id.] Plaintiff then moved to Utah, but 
continued to consult with Companies until approximately May 
1990. [Exhibit A J 10, at 3]. 
All the Morton Companies' computer equipment and 
software, on which Plaintiff relied to do her work, were 
located at the Morton Companies' offices. [Exhibit A f 11, at 
3]. The Morton Companies and Plaintiff understood from the 
outset that Plaintiff's continued assistance to the Companies 
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after February 1990 would necessarily be performed in 
California. The California Defendants never requested that 
Plaintiff provide services in Utah. Consequently, Plaintiff 
commuted to California frequently during the period from March 
through May of 1990 and assisted the Morton Companies there. 
[Exhibit A fl 11, at 3]. 
After Plaintiff's relationship with the Morton 
Companies ended, the California Defendants discovered that, 
during her time with the Morton Companies, Plaintiff had used 
a company-owned credit card extensively to purchase items for 
her personal use. [Exhibit A J 12, at 3]. Such company-owned 
credit cards were to be used only for company business 
expenses. [Id. f 5, at 2]. As the California Defendants 
scrutinized Plaintiff's use of the cards more closely, they 
found that Plaintiff had used her position within the Morton 
Companies to prevent others from discovering her embezzlement, 
fid. 5 12, at 3]. Plaintiff wrote and signed checks from the 
Morton Companies' accounts to pay the credit card balance each 
month without any review or oversight. [Id.] 
When the management of the Morton Companies learned of 
Plaintiff's misuse of the credit cards, Lon Morton complained 
to law enforcement officials in Los Angeles County, 
California. [Id. J 13, at 4]. Plaintiff was later charged in 
Los Angeles County with criminal theft. [Complaint ("Exhibit 
C") J 9, at 3]. Because Plaintiff had moved to Utah, Los 
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Angeles County law enforcement officials necessarily had 
Plaintiff arrested in Utah. 
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the 
California Defendants' reports to Los Angeles County law 
enforcement officials were false, and that the California 
Defendants have initiated a malicious prosecution against her. 
Putting aside for the moment this claim's utter lack of merit, 
it is clear that Plaintiff chose the wrong forum in which seek 
relief. The District Court was correct in deciding that the 
California Defendants cannot constitutionally be subjected to 
personal jurisdiction in Utah. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff seeks redress in Utah against California 
Defendants who have no contacts with Utah. In order to 
establish jurisdiction within due process constraints, 
Plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the California 
Defendants purposefully directed their acts toward the State 
of Utah. The California Defendants have not so directed their 
actions. 
The California Defendants never published any 
statement to any person in Utah, nor did they seek the 
assistance of any Utah officials. Instead, the California 
Defendants complained to law enforcement authorities in 
California about criminal actions perpetrated by the Plaintiff 
in California while she was still a resident of California. 
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Plaintiff has argued that because she became a 
resident of Utah shortly before the California Defendants 
complained of her conduct, it was foreseeable that she would 
suffer an injury in Utah. Under the Supreme Court's due 
process analysis, however, this brand of foreseeability is not 
sufficient to create the necessary minimum contacts. Contacts 
must be viewed from the defendant's perspective and must be 
analyzed to determine not whether some effect was foreseeable, 
but whether the defendant intentionally and purposefully 
directed his actions toward the forum. Only then should the 
defendant "reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the 
forum state." If the defendant did not purposefully direct 
his acts toward the state, and his contacts are merely 
"fortuitous" or the result of the "unilateral conduct" of 
another, then minimum contacts do not exist to establish 
jurisdiction. 
In this case, the California Defendants' only arguable 
contact with Utah arises from their report to California 
authorities that Plaintiff embezzled from the Morton Companies 
while in California. The fact that Plaintiff chose to move to 
Utah shortly after committing a crime, thus requiring 
California authorities to find her in Utah, does not subject 
the California Defendants to jurisdiction here. Plaintiff's 
presence in Utah was not the choice of the California 
Defendants, nor was it the focus of their actions. Plaintiff 
could have taken herself to any state and would eventually 
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have been arrested there. But which state she was in would 
have made no difference to the California Defendants. The 
California Defendants' contacts in Utah were thus "fortuitous" 
and the result of "unilateral" activity by the Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that it 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the California Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff wants to sue the California Defendants in 
Utah despite their utter lack of contacts with Utah and 
despite Utah's lack of interest in the controversy. As the 
following pages demonstrate, the District Court correctly 
concluded that a Utah court cannot assert personal 
jurisdiction over the California Defendants consistent with 
due process. 
I. THE FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL MUST BE 
TAKEN FROM THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY THE 
CALIFORNIA DEFENDANTS. 
In any action, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing facts on which jurisdiction can be based. See 
Tavlor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Behaaen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731, 
733 (10th Cir. 1984) ; Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic 
Surgeons. 807 P. 2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990) (adopting Tenth 
Circuit's guidelines for making pretrial determinations of 
personal jurisdiction and citing with approval Behaaen). When 
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a defendant brings a motion to dismiss and supports the motion 
with an affidavit setting forth the defendant's version of the 
jurisdictional facts, the plaintiff cannot merely rest on the 
allegations of the complaint. If the plaintiff does not 
controvert the defendant's affidavit, "the facts asserted in 
the affidavit are taken as true and the facts recited in the 
complaint are considered only to the extent that they do not 
contradict the affidavit." Arauello v. Industrial Woodworking 
Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). 
We think that a mechanism for determining 
jurisdiction prior to a trial on the merits, analogous to 
the mechanism available for summary judgment, Rule 56(e), 
comports with fairness and due process, and hence that 
allegations in a complaint should not be able to 
withstand the force of specific allegations of fact in 
affidavit form which latter allegations are not 
challenged. 
Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco. Inc.. 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 
1980). 
In this case, the California Defendants submitted the 
affidavits of Defendants Lon Morton and Michael Landau, which 
set forth facts demonstrating a complete lack of contacts 
between the California Defendants and the State of Utah. [See 
Exhibits A and B]. Because Plaintiff did not challenge those 
facts, they are to be taken as true for purposes of this 
appeal. 
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II. THE CALIFORNIA DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE SUBJECTED TO 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN UTAH. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction May be Exercised Only Where 
Due Process Considerations are Satisfied. 
Under Utah's "long-arm" statute, nonresidents submit 
themselves to jurisdiction by "the causing of any injury 
within this state." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3) (Supp. 
1992) . Based on that language, Plaintiff theorizes that her 
allegation of malicious prosecution in California 
automatically subjects the California Defendants to 
jurisdiction by reason of an "injury" caused in Utah. 
However, the scope of Utah's long-arm statute does not frame 
the critical inquiry. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
the Utah long-arm statute should be construed to extend the 
jurisdiction of Utah courts "to the fullest extent allowed by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution." Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching 
Co. , 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). Thus, the critical 
inquiry is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
the California Defendants violates due process. 
Under due process analysis, personal jurisdiction is 
valid only where the defendant has established "certain 
minimum contacts with the [the forum state] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken 
v. Mever. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also Parry v. Ernst 
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Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989). 
Accordingly, the defendant's "conduct and connection with the 
forum state [must be] such that [they] should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there." World Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). "To 
establish minimum contacts, a defendant must 'purposefully 
avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of 
its laws.'" American Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. First 
American Title Co. of Utah. 772 F. Supp. 574, 577 (D. Utah 
1991) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
"This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a 
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a 
result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or 
of the 'unilateral activity of another party or a third 
person.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 
(1985) (citations omitted). 
B. The California Defendants Cannot be Subjected to 
Jurisdiction Unless they Purposefully Directed Their 
Actions Toward Utah. 
Plaintiff urges that jurisdiction is valid in this 
case because: (1) the California Defendants' alleged actions 
affected a Utah resident, and (2) the California Defendants 
knew that Plaintiff lived in Utah and could foresee an effect 
in Utah. In support of her "effects" analysis, Plaintiff 
relies on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 787 (1984) and Keeton v. 
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Hustler Magazine, Inc. 465 U.S. 770 (1984), in which 
defamatory materials published in the forum by out-of-state 
defendants were held to establish sufficient minimum contacts. 
By relying on Calder and Keeton. however, Plaintiff fails to 
recognize the true import of the Supreme Court's minimum 
contacts analysis. 
The Supreme Court's discussion of "effects" in Calder 
cannot be read to mean that any effect caused in the forum 
state creates minimum contacts. A proper reading of the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction decisions reveals a functional 
analysis that focuses not on the mere existence of some 
contacts, but rather on the nature and quality of those 
contacts. Thus, "[t]he Court long ago rejected the notion 
that personal jurisdiction might turn on 'mechanical' tests." 
Burger King Co.. 471 U.S. at 478. A defendant who merely 
causes an effect in the forum state does not necessarily 
establish minimum contacts. 
The Seventh Circuit has aptly synthesized Calder and 
its "effects" language into the whole of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction analysis as follows: 
We do not believe the that the Supreme Court, in Calder, 
was saying that any plaintiff may hale any defendant into 
court in the plaintiff's home state, where the defendant 
has no contacts, merely by asserting that the defendant 
has committed an intentional tort against the plaintiff. 
As the Supreme Court explained in fBurger King Corp.1 
(decided after Calder), "the constitutional touchstone 
remains whether the defendant purposefully established 
minimum contacts in the forum state." 
Wallace v. Herron. 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1985). 
12 
The foreseeabilitv of an effect on the forum also 
fails to establish minimum contacts. The Supreme Court 
articulated this reasoning as follows: 
Although it has been argued that foreseeability of 
causing injury in another State should be sufficient to 
establish such contacts there when policy considerations 
so require, the Court has consistently held that this 
kind of foreseeability is not a "sufficient benchmark" 
for exercising personal jurisdiction, World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S., at 295, 100 S.Ct., 
at 566. Instead, "the foreseeability that is critical to 
due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's 
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that 
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there." Id. at 297, 100 S.Ct., at 567. 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
Thus, it is the purposeful direction of one's 
activities toward the forum state, not simply the resulting 
effects or their foreseeability, that creates the requisite 
contacts. Only through such purposeful direction can the 
defendant "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in 
the forum state. 
C. The California Defendants Did Not Direct Their 
Actions Toward Utah When They Reported 
Plaintiff's Crimes to California Authorities. 
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the California 
Defendants knew of Plaintiff's residence in Utah when they 
reported her crimes in California. Indeed, Plaintiff attempts 
to analogize this case to Calder. by pointing out that Calder, 
like the present case, involved allegations of wrongful 
statements made out of state that caused injury in the state. 
Plaintiff's comparison is misplaced. Unlike the present case, 
the defendants in Calder actually published the allegedly 
defamatory statements in the forum state. See Calder, 465 
U.S. at 785. The Calder defendants clearly directed their 
activities toward the forum state.1 
In contrast, the California Defendants in this case 
never directed their actions toward Utah. When they 
discovered the Plaintiff's embezzlement, the California 
Defendants reported the fact of the embezzlement to California 
authorities. The California Defendants made their report with 
the (correct) expectation that the matter would be handled by 
California authorities in the California court system. 
Although it was foreseeable that Plaintiff might be affected 
in Utah, Utah was not the focal point of the California 
Defendants' actions. The California Defendants did not enlist 
the assistance of Utah authorities or publish any statements 
regarding Plaintiff to anyone in Utah. In short, the 
California Defendants did not concern themselves with Utah. 
1
 Plaintiff relies on a number of other cases that are 
distinguishable for the same reason. See Brainerd v. Governors of 
the Univ. of Alberta. 873 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1989) (defamation 
case in which defendant directed defamatory remarks toward persons 
in forum state) ; Burt v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Nebraska, 
757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1985) (same); Lake v. Lake. 817 F.2d 1416 
(9th Cir. 1987) (attorney misled California court in procuring 
order intended to be taken and used by client to enlist Idaho 
authorities in wrongful action); Simon v. United States. 644 F.2d 
490 (5th Cir. 1980) (attorney prepared and directed invalid 
subpoena to officials in forum state resulting in plaintiff's 
arrest); Duke v. Young, 496 So.2d 37 (Ala. 1986) (defendants 
allegedly directed fraudulent statement toward plaintiff in forum 
state). 
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Plaintiff's presence in Utah was not the choice of the 
California Defendants nor was it their focus. Plaintiff could 
have located herself in Hawaii or Alabama and it would have 
made no difference to the California Defendants. Plaintiff 
would eventually have been arrested somewhere. And the mere 
reporting of criminal activity by the Plaintiff in California, 
which report foreseeably and eventually resulted in her arrest 
elsewhere, cannot be considered to establish minimum contacts 
in any state where Plaintiff unilaterally chooses to reside. 
A defendant's behavior toward the forum state must be more 
substantial than that, such as in Calder and Keeton. where the 
defendants directed their libelous statements into the forum 
state and published them there. The California Defendants' 
contacts with Utah are, in words of the Supreme Court, 
"fortuitous" and arise from the "unilateral activity" of the 
Plaintiff, who happened to move to Utah after committing 
crimes in California. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474. 
D. Personal Jurisdiction Cases that Have Involved 
the Use of Legal Process Support the District 
Court's Determination that the California 
Defendants Lack Minimum Contacts. 
Plaintiff attempts to analogize this case to other 
cases in which the defendants abused judicial process in the 
forum state thereby establishing minimum contacts. See Lake 
v. Lake, 817 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1987); Simon v. United States, 
644 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1981). Examining, as this Court must, 
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the nature and quality of the contacts involved in Lake and 
Simon shows that both cases are distinguishable from this one. 
In Lake, an attorney misled a California court in 
obtaining an ex parte order regarding the custody of a child 
who was located in Idaho. The attorney failed to disclose to 
the California court that the child had lived in Idaho for at 
least sixteen months, thereby making Idaho the correct state 
for jurisdiction over the child's custody determination. See 
Lake, 817 F.2d at 1419. The attorney nevertheless obtained 
the ex parte order from the California court and gave the 
order to his client with the intent that the client would use 
the order to secure the assistance of Idaho authorities to 
gain custody of the child. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
attorney was subject to jurisdiction in Idaho based on his 
actions. Id. at 1423. Critical to the Ninth Circuit's 
decision was the fact that the attorney "intended a foreign 
act, obtaining the California ex parte order, to have an 
effect in the forum state of Idaho." Id. 
In Simon, an attorney practicing in Georgia was held 
to have established minimum contacts in Louisiana. The 
Georgia attorney drafted a subpoena to be served on the 
plaintiff in Louisiana. The attorney had made several 
careless errors in drafting the subpoena, including an 
incorrect name and address. See Simon, 644 F.2d at 492. The 
plaintiff was never served as a result. When the plaintiff 
did not appear to testify in Georgia as the erroneous subpoena 
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demanded, the defendant attorney told the Georgia court that 
the plaintiff had been served and was avoiding compliance with 
the subpoena• Jd. Consequently, the Georgia court issued a 
warrant that resulted in the arrest of the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff sued the Georgia attorney in Louisiana, and the 
Fifth Circuit held that jurisdiction was valid. Once again, 
the key to the Fifth Circuit's decision was that the Georgia 
attorney drafted an erroneous subpoena and directed that the 
subpoena be issued by Louisiana officials on a Louisiana 
plaintiff. Thus, the actions of the Georgia attorney were 
directed at the forum state. 
Lake and Simon are distinguishable from the present 
case because they both involved the use of legal process 
specifically directed at the forum states at issue. In both 
cases, the defendants necessarily reached out to the forum 
states and caused false written materials to be used there. 
Accordingly, Lake and Simon are similar to Calder in the sense 
that the defendants made the forum states the intended focus 
of their actions. In contrast, the California Defendants in 
this case never published any statements to Utah residents or 
officials, and never enlisted the assistance of Utah 
authorities. The arrest of Plaintiff in Utah occurred, at 
best, indirectly and only at the discretion of Los Angeles 
County law enforcement officials. Consequently, the 
California Defendants' contacts with Utah are fundamentally 
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different in their nature and quality than the contacts 
involved in Lake and Simon. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit followed this same reasoning in concluding that 
jurisdiction did not exist in a case indistinguishable from 
this one. See Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 
1985). In Wallace, the plaintiff, an Indiana resident, filed 
a suit for malicious prosecution in Indiana against several 
California residents. The basis for the plaintiff's claim was 
that the defendants had maliciously initiated a lawsuit in 
California against the plaintiff. See Wallace, 778 F.2d at 
392-93. 
When the defendants objected to jurisdiction in 
Indiana, the plaintiff argued that the prosecution of the 
earlier case by defendants against plaintiff, although filed 
in California, had caused him injury in Indiana. The 
plaintiff pointed out that the defendants had established 
minimum contacts with Indiana because, during the alleged 
malicious prosecution in California, they "served 
interrogatories, requested the production of documents, and 
caused plaintiff to respond to five complaints in Indiana 
where the plaintiff resides." Id. at 394. In so arguing, the 
plaintiff relied on Calder, in which the Supreme Court held 
that two Florida residents were subject to jurisdiction in 
California when they authored a libelous article in The 
National Enquirer and circulated it in California. 
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The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument and 
his reliance on Calder as follows: 
The defendants' contacts with Indiana in this case 
are significantly more attenuated than the Calder 
defendants' contacts with California. In Calder. the 
suit grew out of an article about the California 
activities of a California resident whose career was 
centered in California. The defendants relied primarily 
on California sources in writing the article. 104 S.Ct. 
at 1486-87. California was the focal point both of the 
story and any harm suffered. The harm was uniquely 
related to California because the emotional distress and 
injury to professional reputation suffered by the 
plaintiff were primarily a result of the publication of 
the story to California residents. Id. Calder on its 
facts is sharply distinguishable from this malicious 
prosecution case, where the defendants' only arguable 
contacts with Indiana were the legal papers which were 
served on [the plaintiff] in Indiana. 
Wallace, 778 F.2d at 395. 
Looking carefully at the intent and direction of the 
California Defendants' actions, the California Defendants' 
contacts with Utah are similar to the contacts held to be 
insufficient in Wallace. They are not the result of 
purposeful and intentional direction toward Utah and are not 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the California 
Defendants. 
E. Fairness Considerations Also Arcrue Against the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction in Utah. 
Other fairness considerations also militate against 
jurisdiction in this case. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Burger King Corp., even if the defendant has established 
minimum contacts with the forum state, those "contacts may be 
considered in light of other factors to determine whether the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair 
play and substantial justice.'" Burger King Corp.. 471 U.S. 
at 476. 
Thus, courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the 
burden on the defendant," "the forum state's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the 
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the 
most efficient resolution of controversies," and the 
"shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies." 
Id. at 476-77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
The "fairness" factors outlined in Burger King Corp. 
argue against the exercise of jurisdiction over the California 
Defendants. The burden on the California Defendants of 
litigating in Utah is great compared to the burden of 
requiring Plaintiff to litigate her claim in California. All 
the witnesses in this action, except Plaintiff, reside in 
California. 
Moreover, the State of Utah has little interest in 
adjudicating this dispute. Of course, Plaintiff argues that 
Utah has a strong interest in providing redress for tortious 
injuries caused in Utah. However, the circumstances of this 
case belie that argument. This case arises from acts done in 
California by the California Defendants. Likewise, the 
circumstances leading up to the California Defendants' actions 
arose out of criminal activity that occurred in California. 
Utah's connection to this dispute is, at best, attenuated. 
Thus, Plaintiff's claim should be heard in California. 
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CONCLUSION 
The California Defendants have not established 
sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah to allow 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for lack of 
personal jurisdiction must be affirmed. 
J2± DATED this /V"1 day of March, 1993. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
^^Ct^^ /^ 
Gregory D. Phillips 
Scott R. Ryther 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellees were mailed, postage prepaid, 
this /<?'* day of March, 1993, to the following: 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Gregory D. Phillips ^ 
Scott R. Ryther 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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E X H I B I T "A" 
Gregory D. Phillips, Esq. (4645) 
Scott R. Ryther, Esq. (5540) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VALERIE BRYANT, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU, 
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, ] 
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and ] 
CALIFORNIA CAPITAL SERVICES, ] 
INC., : 
Defendants. 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
i LON MORTON 
Civil No. 920902306CV 
i Judge James S. Sawaya 
Lon Morton, being first duly sworn on oath, states the 
following: 
1. I am the President and majority shareholder of Morton 
Capital Management, The Morton company, Inc, and California 
Capital Services {collectively referred to as the "Companies"). I 
make this Affidavit based on personal Icnowledge concerning the 
business dealings of myself and the Companies* 
2. I have never been a resident of Utah* I own no property 
in Utah, and I have never done business in Utah. 
Mor-001-vr 1 
3* The Companies have never done business in Utah. The 
Companies have no clients in Utah, maintain no offices in Utah, 
have never contracted to provide goods or services in Utah, and do 
not purchase goods or services from any suppliers in Utah. In 
short, the Companies have never had any reason to be in Utah or to 
deal with persons or companies in Utah. 
4. In April, 1989, plaintiff Valerie Bryant ("Plaintiff,f) , 
then a resident and citizen of California, began employment with 
the Companies in the position of Controller. 
5. The Companies provided certain of their corporate 
officers with company-owned credit cards to pay for business 
expenses of the Companies. Plaintiff was never an officer of any 
of the Companies and was never provided with a company-owned credit 
card. However, Plaintiff was authorized to use company-owned 
credit cards if needed to make incidental purchases on behalf of 
the Companies. It was understood by all officers and employees, 
that the company-owned credit cards were to be used only for 
company business expenses. 
6. In January 1990, Plaintiff notified me of her intent to 
move to Utah and resign her position as Controller. 
7. Because the Companies would need Plaintiff's assistance 
in making the transition to a new Controller, I requested that 
Plaintiff remain in her position for a while longer. Plaintiff 
agreed to continue her employment as Controller until February 
1990. 
Mor-001 J#T 2 
8. Before Plaintiff left California in February 1990, I 
requested that Plaintiff provide further assistance to the 
Companies and me as we made the transition to the new Controller, 
Ms. Tina Vagnoni. while still in California, Plaintiff agreed to 
work for the Companies as an independent consultant during the 
upcoming transition period. 
9. Plaintiff relocated her residence to Utah immediately 
after her resignation in February 1990. 
10. Plaintiff assisted the Companies on a contract basis and 
as an independent consultant from February 1990 through 
approximately May 1990. 
11 • All the Companies7 computer hardware and software, which 
Plaintiff used in her work for the Companies, were located in the 
Companies' California offices. Accordingly, Plaintiff commuted to 
California from Utah to assist the Companies during the transition 
period. To my knowledge, all of Plaintiff's consulting work for 
the Companies was performed at the offices of Morton Capital 
Management in California* 
12. Soon after Plaintiff had completed her consulting work 
for the Companies, personnel at Morton Capital Management 
discovered that Plaintiff had used a company-owned credit card 
extensively to purchase items for her personal use. As Plaintiff's 
use of the card was scrutinized more closely, employees discovered 
that Plaintiff had used her position as Controller to prevent 
others from discovering her personal use of the card. Plaintiff 
wrote checks from the Companies' cash accounts to pay the credit 
Mor-OCljfT 3 
card balance each month without anyon. .is. r.vi.wing th. charges 
made. Because nobody else reviewed the credit card charges on a 
regular basis, Plaintiff's misappropriation of company funds was 
not discovered until aft.r she left. 
13. Wh.n company management learned of Plaintiff. m i s u s. o f 
the company credit card, I complained to law enforcement officers 
in Los Angeles County, California. 
14. It is my understanding that Plaintiff was charged with 
criminal theft in Los Angeles County, California, and that those 
charges w.r. lat.r dismissed. 
DATED this % 3 day of July<0l992 
LOT M o r t o n ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b.for. m. this j±± day of July, 1992. 
My Commission Expires: 




LOS ANGELES COUNTY ' 
Mycomm. expires JUN 10,1996 
/ j 
Notary Public 
Residing at : £-s fi,.. 
'/-
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E X H I B I T "B" 
Gregory D. Phillips, Esq. (4645) 
Scott R. Ryther, Esq. (5540) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU, 
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and 





Civil No. 920902306CV 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Michael Landau, being first duly sworn on oath, states the 
following: 
1. From May 1986 until January 1991, I was employed in the 
position of Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Morton 
Capital Management. While in that position, I also carried out 
responsibilities for two other companies owned by Mr. Morton, The 
Morton Company, Inc. and California Capital Services (all sometimes 
collectively referred to as the "Companies"). I make this 
Affidavit based on personal knowledge. 
Mor-OCe.trr 1 
2. I have never been a resident of Utah, I own no property 
in Utah, and I have never done business in Utah. 
3. During my employment with the Companies, I never had 
occasion to travel to Utah for business on behalf of the Companies. 
To my knowledge, the Companies have never done business in Utah, 
nor have they done business with persons or companies in Utah* 
DATED this £ > 
Michael Landau 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this -£* day of July, 1992 





LOS ANGELES COUNTY 







Residing at: / ; '•? ^-0 V . A ^ O.T;/'-< 
Mor-0C2*fT 2 
E X H I B I T "C" 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHT 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU, 
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., 




Civil No. 920902306CV 




tt Fourth South 
It U k t City 
Jtah 84111 
1)524-1000 
Plaintiff Valerie Bryant alleges as follows for her 
cause of action against defendants: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Defendants Lon Morton and Michael Landau are 
individuals residing in Calabassa, California. 
3. Defendants Morton Capital Management, The Morton 
Company, Inc. and California Capital Services, Inc. are 
California corporations which are related entities having 
common ownership and in which Lon Morton is a principal. 
4. In April of 1989, plaintiff was hired by Lon 
Morton to provide services for each of the corporate defendants 
named above. She was given the title of Controller of Morton 
Capital Management, Inc., and its related entities. Mr. Morton 
agreed, in the presence of defendant Landau, that plaintiff 
would be compensated at the rate of $6,000.00 per month, with 
$4,000.00 per month to be paid in cash and plaintiff being 
authorized to charge $2,000.00 per month on various credit 
cards issued to the corporate defendants. 
5. Between April of 1989 and January of 1990, 
plaintiff performed services for the corporate defendants. In 
January of 1990, she resigned from her position and informed 
Mr. Morton of her impending move to Utah. 
6. Mr. Morton persuaded plaintiff to continue her 
employment until the end of February, 1990. Following her 
relocation to Utah, Ms. Bryant continued to provide contract 
services to defendants at the request of defendant Morton until 
May of 1990. 
7. Following plaintiff's termination of her 
relationship with defendants, Mr. Morton and Mr. Landau began 




tt Fourth South 
It Ukt City 
Nth 84111 
1)524-1000 
funds from the corporate defendants in an effort to damage her 
reputation and credibility with regulators of the defendants1 
business operations. 
8. Defendants Morton and Landau, acting with malice 
towards plaintiff, initiated a prosecution against plaintiff, 
who they knew to be living in Utah, by means of false 
statements and perjured testimony. 
9. Criminal charges of felony theft were brought in 
Los Angeles County, State of California, against plaintiff as a 
direct result of the actions of defendants Morton and Landau 
acting on behalf of the corporate defendants. A warrant of 
arrest was issued in California and plaintiff was ultimately 
arrested in Salt Lake County, State of Utah in January of 1991 
and held to answer the false charges filed in California. 
10. As a direct and proximate result of the malicious 
prosecution initiated by the defendants, plaintiff incurred in 
excess of $25,000.00 in expenses associated in legal fees and 
travel costs, suffered emotional distress and general damages 
and was injured in her reputation. 
11. Following further investigation by the office of 
the prosecuting attorney, wherein the falsity of the 
defendants' allegations was revealed, charges against plaintiff 
were dismissed by the Court on motion of the prosecution in 
September of 1991. 
-3-
WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that judgment be entered 
against each defendant for an amount established by the 
evidence to fully compensate her for her special and general 
damages, plus an additional amount in punitive damages to 
adequately punish defendants for their intentional and 
malicious misconduct. 
DATED this 33 day of hb*jjL , 1992. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
^JnjLdJL 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Address: 
1291 E. Earl Way 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
1565d 
M. Dafvid Eckers 
Attorneys for Plai 
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A D D E N D U M 
Gregory D. Phillips, Esq. (4645) 
Scott R. Ryther, Esq. (5540) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 




LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU, j 
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, ) 
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and ) 
CALIFORNIA CAPITAL SERVICES, ) 
INC., ] 
Defendants. 
i ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
I TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
I PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Civil No. 920902306CV 
1 Judge James S. Sawaya 
The defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction was submitted to the Court pursuant to a Notice to 
Submit for Decision dated August 11, 1992. 
The Court, having reviewed the written memoranda and 
supporting affidavits filed by the parties, concludes that 
plaintiff Valerie Bryant has failed to carry her burden of 
demonstrating that any of the defendants in this case can be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of this Court consistent with their 
rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, 
the Court hereby orders as follows: 
Mor-007.trr 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants' "Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Personal-Jurisdiction" against plaintiff Valerie Bryant 
is GRANTED, and the complaint of Plaintiff Valerie Bryant filed 
herein is hereby DISMISSED. 
DATED this * * - day of September /l?92. 
The ¥Lop6rable James S.^Sawaya 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
Mof-007irr 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction was hand delivered this A day of 
September, 1992, to the following: 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M©f-007.srr 3 
> 
a •, v. i* 'it •JCTZI **r* 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
/ 
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LON MORTON, MICHAEL LANDAU, 
MORTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 
THE MORTON COMPANY, INC., and 
CALIFORNIA CAPITAL SERVICES, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 920902306CV 




.1 Fourth South 
I Lako City 
tan M m 
U24.1000 
Plaintiff Valerie Bryant hereby gives notice, pursuant 
to the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, that she is taking an appeal of the Order 
of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing her Complaint, 
which Order was entered on September 23, 1992, to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
DATED this Jil day of Oat_ , 1992. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
BV n IL.JC,AJL 
M. Dav/id Eckersley^ 
Attorneys for Pla intif f 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on the 2A day of Octooer, 
1992, I caused to oe mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following: 
Gregory D. Pnillips, Esq. 
Scott R. Ryther, Esq. 
KIMBALL, PARR, tfADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 




• I, Suit* 000 
:ourth $o«tn 
*k« City 
) 84111 
>241000 
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